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Abstract 
 
G. W. F. Hegel is usually regarded as a/the metaphysician par excellence. However, his 
thought is multi-faceted and its overarching metaphysical scheme can be viewed as self-
deconstructive and containing many elements that represent a non-metaphysical 
philosophical-epistemological stance. This paper will explore the possibilities of self-
overcoming of Hegel’s metaphysics with reference to his understanding of the concept of 
the absolute as expounded in the Phenomenology of Spirit, especially the Preface. The 
paper is composed of two main sections from the ontological and epistemological 
perspectives respectively. The first section deals with Hegel’s groundbreaking 
understanding of the absolute within the philosophical context of his time, explicating his 
agreements and disagreements with Spinoza, Kant’s critical philosophy and the post-
Kantian philosophy of identity, represented by Fichte and Schelling, and, above all, 
highlighting Hegel’s own innovations, coming to grips with the intricacies of his thought. 
The section argues for a trans-immanent (J.-L. Nancy’s neologism) conception of the 
absolute in the Phenomenology, which means an absolute, opening up from and 
remaining within the very limits of human reason and worldly immanence, generating 
itself ad infinitum within its own finite limits. The second section, in turn, suggests a non-
metaphysical way of understanding the knowledge of the absolute proposed by Hegel. 
His epistemological polemics with the Romantics is also considered, after that, disclosing 
self-deconstructive elements in Hegel’s system, in fact offering a gallery of images of 
fake, perspectival, relative “absolutes”. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
From the very outset, I must concede that this paper may be deficient because, although 
being a teacher of philosophy of religion, I am not a proper scholar of Hegel. That is, I 
am not quite familiar with his entire philosophical system, the current state of Hegel 
research in the world, and have to rely heavily on secondary sources. Nevertheless, when 
receiving a call for papers for the conference Metamorphoses of the Absolute, I felt 
compelled to choose Hegel from the whole range of philosophers – e.g., Fichte, 
Schelling, Bradley, Royce, Findlay et al. – who have reflected on this subject, perhaps in 
particular because of the ambiguity of Hegel’s thought, which allows for multi-faceted 
interpretations, including such interpretations that are conformable with today’s non-
metaphysical, deconstructive moods on the philosophical scene. 
 
Moving to the topic and starting with terminology, the term “absolute” derives from the 
Latin absolutus, which in the ordinary Latin language means loosened, released, 
detached, and as such thereby also complete (cf. Inwood, 27). Absolutus is the past 
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participle of absolvere – to loosen from, detach, complete respectively. Thus the absolute 
as detached etc. accordingly means something not dependent on, not conditional on, not 
relative to or restricted by anything else. As complete, the absolute also means something 
self-contained, perfect and the like. Of course, a metaphysical association also comes 
with this understanding – the absolute as something detached in the sense of being 
detached from reality. The absolute as a noun has been used for quite a long time, 
especially in the Middle Ages: for example, in Nicholas Cusanus’s De docta ignorantia 
(1440), referring to God. German philosophers after Kant – which is Hegel’s context – 
commonly used das Absolute to refer to the ultimate, unconditioned reality. 
 
Hegel is usually regarded as the metaphysician par excellence. After all, the main task of 
philosophy, for him, is a rational knowledge of the absolute (quote referred to in Beiser, 
4). This understanding of philosophy conforms to the definition of metaphysics. Kant, for 
example, in the Critique of Pure Reason sets the standard for understanding metaphysics 
in this sense, namely, as the striving to know the unconditioned through pure reason. 
 
However, whether Hegel can be considered as a metaphysician in this classical sense 
depends on several factors, such as 
• How we understand metaphysics, 
• How Hegel understands the absolute, 
• How we interpret Hegel. 
In this paper, I will explore the possibilities of Hegel’s overcoming the abovementioned 
kind of metaphysics by reinterpreting the absolute in a more non-metaphysical way 
during his earlier, formative Jena period, in the Phenomenology of Spirit and its Preface – 
when Hegel himself has not yet become the orthodox, official philosopher of the Prussian 
State. At the very least, as I see it, with Hegel, the concept of the absolute undergoes a 
decisive metamorphosis in the history of philosophy – the absolute becoming dispersed in 
the actual world. 
 
Representatives of different philosophical positions have very differently interpreted 
Hegel, who is notorious for the obscurity and complexity of his texts. I should note that a 
non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel, of course, will be more in line with the legacy 
of the “left wing” than with the “right wing” Hegelians – if I may here refer to these two 
conflicting immediate neo-Hegelian perceptions as representative of how Hegel’s 
thinking can be approached. I also am predisposed to the interpretations that radically 
atheologise Hegel. In any case, a great thinker like him does not have to be consistent. 
Inconsistency is much richer in novel possibilities – especially today, as we approach 
philosophical texts through deconstructive strategies, looking for self-deconstructive, 
heterogeneous elements within the systems of thought. 
 
At this point I would like to conclude the introductory remarks and move on to the 
descriptive, analytical part of this paper, consisting of two main sections, one of which is 
somewhat ontological, another somewhat epistemological. The first section will deal with 
Hegel’s groundbreaking understanding of the absolute within the philosophical context of 
his time, while the second section will suggest a non-metaphysical way of understanding 
the “absolute knowing” proposed by Hegel. 
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2 Hegel’s Conception of the Absolute within the Philosophical Context 
of His Time 
 
In the Phenomenology, there are implicit discussions regarding the absolute with Hegel’s 
post-Kantian contemporaries, such as Schelling, Fichte and the Romantics. While Hegel 
himself does not explicitly define the absolute, his former ally Schelling does. For him, 
the absolute is that which is not dependent on anything else in order to exist or be 
conceived and also which is without qualification, undivided (see Beiser, 4). The 
historical antecedent of this concept for both Schelling and Hegel is Spinoza’s similar 
definition of substance (referred to in Beiser, 4). Schelling, following Spinoza, calls the 
absolute “the infinite substance” or “the in-itself” (das An-sich). Moreover, both 
Schelling and Hegel, just like Spinoza, identify this absolute substance with the universe 
as a whole. Since the universe contains everything there is, there is nothing outside it for 
it to depend on. For anything less, there will be something outside it in relation to which 
it must be conceived (Beiser, 4). Already this Spinozistic understanding of the absolute is 
a kind of overcoming metaphysics understood as speculation about some transcendent 
entities, such as God, Providence, the soul etc., as this conception does not deal with the 
absolute as an entity, even if the highest one, but instead deals with the whole of which 
all entities are only a part (cf. Beiser, 5). 
 
Of course, neither Schelling, nor Hegel remained content with Spinoza’s system. Before 
Schelling, his former master Fichte, struggling with the problem of knowledge, has 
proposed the principle of identity between the subject and the object, the knower and the 
known. The paradigmatic instance of such knowledge being actualised is self-knowledge, 
whereby the subject-object identity becomes the “absolute ego”, comprising all reality 
and creating its objects in the act of knowing – a kind of divine intellectus archetypus, 
though conceived as being no more than a regulative principle à la Kant (see Beiser, 
12ff). 
 
On this basis, Schelling developed a conception of the absolute as a neutral identity 
underlying both the subject (mind) and the object (nature) (see Inwood, 27). Although 
this conception may superficially appear as Spinozistic and Fichtean inasmuch as it treats 
the metaphysical contrasts of the subjective and objective as the attributes of a single 
substance, it radically differs from these former thinkers by defining this substance in 
vitalistic, teleological terms, as a living, primal force, manifesting in a hierarchical order 
from minerals and plants to human self-consciousness. In this new understanding, the 
absolute is conceived as an organism, a self-generating and self-organising whole. 
Schelling also saw this conception as more consistent with the latest scientific 
developments (see Beiser, 5f). 
 
In the Preface to the Phenomenology Hegel takes over this organic and dynamic 
conception of the absolute, at the same time criticising and overcoming it. In Hegel’s 
opinion, in the Fichtean-Schellingian absolute as the subject-object identity, its finite 
modes have been subsumed in a kind of solipsistic subjectivity. As a result, the realm of 
the finite and appearance still remains excluded from such an absolute. Even if 
 4
everything has been subject to the absolute idea, a closer look reveals not the same 
principle having spontaneously assumed different shapes (which will be Hegel’s own 
proposal), but rather an “abstract universality”, “monochromatic formalism” (Hegel, 9) – 
“shapeless repetition of one and the same formula, only externally applied to diverse 
materials, thereby obtaining merely a boring show of diversity” (Hegel, 8). 
 
Also in this case, the absolute, contrary to its definition, becomes dependent, that is, 
becomes conceivable only in contrast to something it is not, namely, the apparent and the 
finite (Beiser, 7). Accordingly, Hegel is compelled to correct Schelling’s limited 
formulation of the absolute that excludes the modes which determine the specific 
characteristics of entities, hurling them “all into the abyss of vacuity without further 
development or any justification” (Hegel, 9). Dealing with something from the 
perspective of such an absolute consists merely in declaring that although the absolute 
has just been referred to as something definite, yet, in this absolute, as expressed by the 
Leibnizian-Fichtean-Schellingian idealist identity formula A=A, “there is nothing of the 
kind for there all is one” (Hegel, 9). Then Hegel proceeds with his well-known 
metaphorical utterance: such an absolute is nothing but a “night in which, as the saying 
goes, all cows are black…” (Hegel, 9) 
 
Hegel does not limit himself to adding a propaedeutic to the absolute of the philosophers 
of identity; instead, he modifies the very conceptions of the absolute and its knowing 
(Hyppolite, 7). Hegel maintains that the absolute, as the Schellingian living substance, 
can be the subject or actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the 
mediation of its self-othering with itself, or pure, simple negativity, for this very reason at 
the same time being the bifurcation of the simple (Hegel, 10). Only through this 
dialectical process, through the doubling of the opposition and the subsequent negation of 
the indifferent diversity and the immediate simplicity as its antithesis, only through this 
self-restoring sameness or this reflection in otherness within itself – not an original or 
immediate unity as such – is the true absolute reached (Hegel, 10). Only the whole 
process of the substance consummating itself through its own development is true, 
whereas of the absolute, as Hegel proceeds, “it must be said that it is essentially a result, 
that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz. 
to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself” (Hegel, 11). 
 
The absolute thus requires mediation, as at first immediately enunciated, it is only the 
universal, since such words as “the divine”, “the eternal”, “the absolute” by themselves 
do not express what is contained in them. To make them meaningful, at least a 
proposition is required. The proposition, in turn, contains a becoming-other, which has to 
be taken back, or is a mediation. There can be no knowledge which is not mediated, 
including the knowledge of the absolute. The philosophy of identity rejects such 
mediation with horror, as if absolute cognition were surrendered when more is made of 
mediation than in simply saying that it is nothing absolute and is completely absent in the 
absolute (Hegel, 11; see also Lauer, 309). In Hegel’s view, such abhorrence stems from 
ignorance of the nature of mediation and of absolute cognition itself. Mediation is the 
aforementioned self-moving selfsameness, the moment of pure negativity of the subject, 
simple becoming. As such, it must include reflection and reason. 
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To be sure, in Hegel’s view, the absolute, in order to be properly absolute, must be the 
unity of the infinite and the finite, the substance and the subject; otherwise it would be 
less than absolute. The absolute by definition must include the substance and its modes, 
including the subject and all the flux of worldly finitude and appearances (see Beiser, 7). 
Hence, instead of the Schellingian “vacuity of the night”, for Hegel the absolute is the 
dynamic world in a never-ending, serendipitous development process, in which the 
appearance itself “is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away, 
but is ‘in itself’, and constitutes the actuality and the movement of the life of truth” 
(Hegel, 27). Hegel describes this process with another metaphor – the “Bacchanalian 
revel in which no member [i.e. no element of appearance] is not drunk”, here or there 
dropping in for the feast or out for repose (Hegel, 27).  
 
Noteworthy, this understanding of the absolute is exempt from Kant’s critique of 
metaphysics, the main target of which was the metaphysics of the Leibnizian-Wolffian 
school, which conceived of the absolute in deistic terms as a supernatural entity beyond 
the realm of nature. Hegel and Schelling agree with Kant that metaphysics in this sense is 
impossible, only the diagnosis of the impossibility is different. Such a metaphysics is 
impossible not because the supernatural is unknowable, as Kant thought, but because it 
does not exist at all. If the absolute is conceived in sheerly naturalistic terms, then 
metaphysics does not require the transcendent, noumenal knowledge, condemned by 
Kant. All there is to know, is nature herself, the nature, which is given in experience 
(Beiser, 8). 
 
Importantly, Hegel in this way also proposes a solution to the Kantian bifurcation of the 
subject. Kant’s problem in the “Transcendental Deduction” of the Critique of Pure 
Reason is: How is empirical knowledge possible if it depends on universal principles that 
themselves cannot be verified in experience? Universal a priori concepts provide the 
form of experience, whereas particular a posteriori intuitions or impressions furnish the 
matter of experience. However, this scheme ends up in a dualism similar to Descartes’s 
dualism of mind and body. In Kant’s case, there appears to be a loss of any relation 
between concepts and perceptions, between understanding and sensibility. Kant’s own 
solution was to identify the absolute with the a priori concepts that apply to experience as 
its necessary transcendental conditions – space, time and the categories. This solution 
remained unsatisfactory for Hegel (Beiser, 10f). In Hegel’s perspective, Kant himself, 
with his insistence on the noumena, things-in-themselves beyond experience and 
knowledge, remains caught up in the traditional metaphysics. Hegel himself wants to 
purge any vestiges of the metaphysical world behind the real one (Solomon, 8). In 
Hegel’s corrected Schellingian conception, the subject and the object are just different 
degrees of organisation and development of the absolute in its manifestation in nature, 
and the dualism is thus overcome. 
 
Hegel sees as what is absolute in nothing which lies beyond the experiences and activities 
of human beings; the absolute is what is entirely present (das durchaus Gegenwärtige), 
what is on hand and actual, not what is over and behind (drüben und hinten), not what is 
realised in a supramundane consciousness, nor in a timeless, comprehensive vision 
 6
(Findlay, 20). Likewise, mention may be made that in no case can Hegel’s absolute be 
endowed with any religiously-spiritual or mystical connotation. There is no place for any 
kind of “mysticism” in his system, except perhaps for what Fackenheim calls “a 
mysticism of reason”, which is no flight from the actual world, taking it as mere sham 
and illusion. Instead, according to Hegel’s thinking, such a flight itself would be a sham 
compared to the actual world which, even if ultimately fragmented, has substance and 
reality. “The Absolute, if accessible to thought at all, is accessible only to a thought 
which remains with the world of sense, not to a thought which shuns it in ‘monkish 
fashion’” (Fackenheim, 79f). The subject matter of the Phenomenology, the Spirit (Geist) 
itself, is thus more of a world-spirit (Weltgeist), “an all-embracing, secular, historical, 
concept-using entity, realizing itself through time and human events, and, especially, 
through the thinking of philosophers” (Solomon, 252). It is the human, worldly spirit. 
 
To conclude this section, I would like to point out that if Hegel’s early system of the 
Phenomenology can be deemed as metaphysics at all, it is no more than a kind of 
“metaphysics” of the “hither side of being”, not of the beyond of the subject and the 
world. To step outside the times of Hegel and make associations with contemporary 
philosophy, the first figure coming to my mind is Jean-Luc Nancy. I think that in broad 
lines Hegel’s absolute can be inscribed within Nancy’s concept of the “trans-immanence” 
of the world, which means something like an absolute, opening up from and remaining 
within the very limits of human reason and worldly immanence, generating itself ad 
infinitum within its own finite limits. When the “beyond of the world has been dissipated, 
the out-of-place instance of sense opens itself up within the world” (Nancy, 55). So, the 
sense of the absolute ultimately belongs to the structure of the world, hollowing out 
therein its own “transimmanence” – designating the transcendence of the very 
immanence of the world, or simply – its existence and exposition (Nancy, 55). This can 
be said about Hegel’s absolute as well, and that is the meaning of Hegel’s “speculative 
Good Friday”, “the Calvary of absolute Spirit” in the last sentences of the 
Phenomenology. The dissipation of the absolute. 
 
3 Knowledge of Hegel’s Absolutely Relative “Absolute” 
 
The argumentation in the previous section is inseparable from epistemological issues, 
which will be the subject matter of this section. Just as the absolute had to comprise the 
phenomenal world, the absolute cannot be what it is if it does not include the knowledge 
of the absolute and its manifestation in the phenomenal world as well as the knowledge 
of the relationship between the former and the latter (see Inwood, 27). The absolute in its 
original, metaphysical sense (e.g., in a proposition “the absolute is the substance”) is 
superfluous, as it does not have a subject term conceivable apart from the concept applied 
to the subject term. So, the absolute in this sense could be omitted altogether, instead 
concentrating only on the concepts that apply to the phenomenal world (such as 
“substance”) and to the subject, as well as on what constitutes the essence of the 
phenomenal world and of the subject insofar as neither of these is conceivable without 
such concepts applied by the subject (cf. Inwood, 28). 
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So, on this account, the absolute can be understood not as the Schellingian neutral 
identity underlying the subject and object, but as the conceptual system embedded in the 
manifestation of the absolute in the phenomenal world and the subject alike. Since this 
conceptual system is not static but develops, manifesting itself in successively higher 
levels of nature, in the advancement of human knowledge over history etc., the absolute 
is then not static, bet always developing – up to the philosophy of Hegel himself 
(Inwood, 28). In any case, the absolute is thus inextricably linked with the knowable 
reality. The absolute becomes the world of experience itself and, accordingly, can itself 
be known and, notably, contra Kant, can be known as it is in-itself, inasmuch as there is 
nothing beyond (which is not to say that the absolute could not be known otherwise or 
differently – Solomon, 301). 
 
Furthermore, speaking of Hegel’s epistemology of the absolute, it is important to mention 
his polemics with the Romantics – Schlegel, Jacobi, Novalis, Hölderlin, the young 
Schleiermacher and others. For the Romantics, the absolute was a poetic image, a 
metaphor for a great cosmic harmony and the poet’s being at one with the universe. 
 
In a certain agreement with Kant, who assigned the absolute the status of a regulative 
idea which cannot be known constitutively, the Romantics also held that the absolute 
cannot be known – as the conceptual means of language are rather limited for its 
magnificence. At the same time, the Romantics believed that a human being can come 
into contact with the absolute differently: directly through intuition, feeling or faith, for 
example.  
 
Hegel’s contention is that reason is capable of knowing the absolute, and he contrasts his 
own philosophy, which attains the absolute through concept (Begriff), with those who 
insist that the absolute is not supposed to be comprehended (begriffen), but is instead to 
be felt and intuited (gefühlt und angeschaut) through feeling and intuition (Gefühl und 
Anschauung) (Hegel, 4). Hegel considers these other means of awareness of the absolute 
as lower forms of consciousness compared to reason and argues that the absolute can be 
truly grasped only through the concept. As reality as such also includes consciousness, 
“the absolute knowledge” must also include knowing that, in one respect, reality is 
determined by consciousness, through concepts. Truth in this scheme is the conceptual 
activity through which we conceive the world together with our awareness that these 
concepts determine the world. As there is no reality beyond experience, truth is 
experience conceived through the concept (Solomon, 265). Thus, the “absolute” 
functions epistemologically as a kind of bridge between consciousness and reality. 
 
Yet – and this will be the deconstructive contention of this paper – Hegel’s own 
arguments seem to undermine the conceptual “absolute knowledge”. To recall, Hegel 
knows perfectly well that concepts are always mediating, contingent upon language, 
culture etc., and he constructs his system of Phenomenology accordingly (Solomon 189). 
If deprived from these contexts, concepts become pure, empty abstractions – “the black 
cows in the night”. Just as the word “God”, the religious counterpart of the philosophical 
absolute, is by itself “a meaningless sound, a mere name” if not posited as subject, to 
which, again, the predicates are affixed by a movement belonging to the knower of this 
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subject, not belonging to the subject’s fixed point. The subject can be fixed only in 
anticipation, whereas the actuality is self-movement (Hegel, 12f). 
  
From this perspective, the Phenomenology may be understood as conjuring up before our 
eyes “a gallery of images” (Hegel, 492) of various forms of this “absolute”, manifesting 
through human experience in time and space. The only “absolute unity” of the world, 
forms of consciousness (Gestalten des Bewusstseins) etc. in this case can only be – the 
unity of infinite diversity. In fact, I would say that, in this sense, Hegel’s “absolute” is not 
even the absolute but a fake, a simulacrum, the same aforementioned mere name, empty 
word. Accordingly, the Phenomenology can be viewed not as a treatise in metaphysics 
but, say, in conceptual anthropology (Solomon 27), history of ideas and the like. The 
absolute truth can never be reached, as it is always in a never-ending process of 
conceptual construction and development. As such, it can never be any particular insight 
or knowing. There is no absolute viewpoint that encompasses all the others. There are 
just indefinitely many more viewpoints (Solomon 301) – some of which are laid out and 
fixed in the Phenomenology. 
 
Given these conditions, the “absolute knowledge” dealt with in the last chapter of the 
Phenomenology may pertain not so much to a view of reality itself than to a view about 
views (Solomon 192). The “absolute knowledge” inevitably entails the comprehension of 
reality through the totality of different conceptions, viewpoints that may be compatible 
only if taken up as a whole on some presumably “absolute” level (Solomon 192).  
Ultimately, what one has in the “absolute knowledge” is a kind of a bird’s eye view – 
with the bird being the “owl of Minerva” – on a multitude of views, among which none is 
“the” single, correct, absolute one, even if it may appear such from a particular 
perspective. The “absolute” then becomes a safeguard against the pluralism of “objective 
truths” – even though contradiction, even paradox, is a conditio sine qua non for Hegel-
the-dialectician, and, as in his system, is an indicator of the richness of possibilities. For 
the world in itself is contradictory – which only philosophy through reason’s “absolute 
knowing” can reconcile. Only keeping in mind that the “absolute” of Hegel ultimately 
appears all too relative – indeed, “a relative absolute” (Solomon 196). 
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